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The objective of this study is to examine the effect that state-level and county-level 
economic variables have on U.S. Navy recruiting. To achieve this goal, I conducted state-
level and county-level fixed effects models that examined the effects of state and county 
unemployment rates, as well as state employment-to-population ratios on Navy recruiting 
applicant rates, accession rates, high-quality applicant rates, and high-quality accession 
rates over the years from 1991 to 2013. Through the state-level and county-level fixed 
effects model estimation, it is determined that state unemployment rates, state 
employment-to-population ratios, and county unemployment rates all have a statistically 
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Recruiting in the military has been quite cyclical over the past 25 years. While 
recruiting was relatively easy in the early 1990s, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all 
missed recruiting targets in 1998 and 1999 (Warner, Simon, & Payne, 2003). According 
to Warner et al. (2003), during this period, these services also witnessed a decline in 
quality recruits, those recruits with a high school diploma and that have a scored a 50 or 
greater on the Armed Forces Qualification Test from the early 1990s. To address the 
recruiting shortages of the late 1990s, services implemented various enlistment bonuses 
and bolstered the recruiting force (Warner et al., 2003). However, in an October 2014 
birthday message to the Navy’s Human Resources Community from the Navy’s Human 
Resources flag officers, HR leaders boasted of how Navy recruiting ended FY 2014 
having achieved 100% of its Enlisted Active component mission for the 89th month in a 
row (A. Andrews, personal communication, October 21, 2014).  
The roughly seven and a half consecutive years of the Navy meeting recruiting 
targets dates back to about the time that the Great Recession began in December 2007, 
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The common thread linking 
these two periods of recruiting together is that of the health of the U.S. economy—
consistently a factor in recruiting success. During periods where the economy is doing 
well, military recruiting in general tends to struggle. Conversely, when the economy is 
down, recruiting targets seem to be met more easily.  
One explanation offered for this trend is that some view the military as a means of 
professional stability that is unaffected by the state of the economy (Murphy, 1999). 
According to Murphy, when the economy is performing poorly, potential recruits may 
view the opportunity cost of joining the military as low. However, when the economy is 
doing well, there are outside options that may be perceived as more alluring in the 
civilian sector. There are other explanations for why people join the military that may or 
may not be related to the economy. People also join because of the educational benefits 
the military offers its members and for patriotic reasons such as during the period 
following the tragic events of 9/11 (Spring 2014 Youth Poll Propensity, 2014). 
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While the economy, educational benefits, and patriotism are all reasons 
individuals may decide on joining the military, these very reasons also offer rationale on 
why individuals seek employment outside the military. Some view the civilian sector as 
providing higher wages and a more stable home life than the military can offer, and 
therefore are not willing to join the military. Others seek higher education on their own, 
rather than joining the military, as it offers the opportunity for higher wages than the 
military can offer. There are also those individuals who will not join the military due to 
events such as 9/11 because they reject the prospects of participating in war.  
Studies being conducted by Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies 
(JAMRS) are already beginning to show a decline in the propensity of youth to enlist 
(Spring 2014 Youth Poll Propensity, 2014). With the economy in the midst of recovery, 
and events such as 9/11 becoming more of a distant memory, recruiting could become as 
difficult as it was in the late 1990s and mid-2000s, leading to recruiting targets being 
missed once more.  
This thesis examines the impact that state and county economic variable rates 
have on Navy recruiting, while also examining whether there are economic variables 
other than the unemployment rate that can better predict recruiting. In particular, this 
study will answer the following research questions: Does the county or state economic 
variable rate offer a better predictor for Navy recruiting? Is there an economic variable 
other than unemployment rate that offers a better predictor for Navy recruiting? Through 
an understanding of these effects, the Navy will be able to better identify means of coping 
with the constant change that occurs in the economy every few years in order to continue 
to meet recruiting requirements. This study will also provide a framework for analysis in 
other services, leading to a more resilient and diverse U.S. Military that is able to sustain 
higher overall levels of readiness. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II presents 
background and literature review. Chapter III describes the data and methodology used in 
the study, and Chapter IV provides the regression results and discussion. Finally, Chapter 
V presents conclusions and recommendations drawn from the study.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a background on Navy Recruiting. It includes a brief 
overview of economic conditions and the history of the propensity to enlist in the military 
in the United States from 1991 to 2014. From there, the chapter offers other factors that 
also affect military recruiting, and then ends with a review of previous research related to 
this study.  
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NAVY RECRUITING 
1. History of Navy Recruiting Command 
Navy recruiters have been a part of U.S. history since the time of Revolutionary 
War when the nation’s first Navy recruiters were assigned to the Marine Committee. 
With the importance of the naval force growing, the Secretary of the Navy assumed 
direct responsibility for recruiting. After shuffling from the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair, and then to the Bureau of Navigation, the mission of naval recruiting was 
assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1942. 
On April 6, 1971, the Secretary of the Navy established the Navy Recruiting 
Command to serve as a field activity of the Chief of Naval Personnel. This change came 
in response to the end of the military draft, causing an increased emphasis on Navy 
recruiting, with the last draft call being made the following year (CNRC, n.d.). Navy 
Recruiting Command remained in Washington, DC, until July 1999, when the 
headquarters relocated to its current facilities at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, 
Millington, TN. 
With the constant evolution and technological advances that continue to take 
place in the Navy, successful recruiting remains paramount. As the equipment on the 
Navy’s ships, submarines, and aircraft continues to become more sophisticated, the duty 
lies upon Navy recruiters to find, inspire, and recruit the best and brightest young men 
and women to field the diverse and high-tech Navy of the 21st century. 
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2. Mission 
According to Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC):  
Navy Recruiting Command is charged to seek out, source and recruit the 
best and brightest young men and women to sustain and maintain a cadre 
of ready personnel. This state of readiness is achieved through: strong 
integrity-based leadership, spirited teamwork, and a commitment to 
excellence. Navy Recruiting Command is ready to responsibly employ its 
assets to provide its recruiting field all the necessary resources to deliver 
the highest quality Sailors to the fleet, and it has a professional and moral 
obligation to uphold our covenant with our recruiting force – military and 
civilian – and our Future Sailors (n.d.).   
3. Command Structure 
The structure of the Navy Recruiting Command consists of the following five 
components: 
a. Navy Recruiting Command 
As the headquarters, Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) provides strategic 
oversight for Navy recruiting. Working hand-in-hand with the Chief of Naval Personnel 
(CNP), NRC receives future personnel requirements. In doing so, NRC then establishes 
policy guidelines and incentive programs that encourage efficient and ethical recruiting 
practices to achieve requirements. 
b. Navy Recruiting Region  
Located within NRC headquarters in Millington, TN, region commanders divide 
the nation into two regions, Region East and Region West. Figure 1 depicts Region East, 
which is located to the right of the red line and Region West is all located to left. Each 
region is composed of 13 districts, which includes the following overseas locations: 
Europe, Guam, Japan, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  
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Figure 1.  Regions and District Map (from CNRC, n.d.) 
c. Navy Recruiting District 
There are 26 Navy recruiting districts (NRDs) divided between the two Navy 
recruiting regions, each strategically placed throughout the nation (see Figure 1) to ensure 
national recruiting coverage.  
d. Navy Recruiting District Division 
Each NRD geographic AOR is further subdivided into divisions. Depending on 
the geographic area of an NRD, an NRD may consist of 6 to 10 divisions. 
e. Navy Recruiting Station 
The Navy recruiting stations (NRS) are spread out among the 26 NRDs and are 
ideally placed in a geographic location with a high propensity for enlistment. NRS 
locations are identified and organized by ZIP code through demographic and past 
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production data, and all ZIP codes with the NRD must be assigned to a NRS regardless of 
population density. 
C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FROM 1991–2014 
Understanding the economic climate over the last 15 years is important to identify 
the relationship between unemployment rates and recruitment rates. The U.S. economy 
has experienced numerous ups and downs since 1990. Figure 2 illustrates the changes 
that have taken place in the unemployment rate since 1990.  
1. Early 1990s Recession 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession of the 
early 1990s lasted from July 1990 to March 1991. This recession was mainly attributed to 
the workings of the business cycle, as well as events such as the S&L Crisis in 1989, and 
a spike in gas prices as the result of the Gulf War. During this period, the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reported that unemployment rose from 5.4% in 
January 1990 to 6.8% in March 1991, and continued to rise to a peak of 7.8% in June 
1992.  
2. 1990s United States Boom 
The 1990s United States boom officially began with the end of the early 1990s 
recession in March 1991, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
During this extended period of economic prosperity, the GDP increased continuously for 
almost ten years, which is the longest recorded expansion in the history of the United 
States. This period experienced strong economic growth, steady job creation, low 
inflation, and rising productivity. Events such as the dot.com bubble jumpstarted the 
economy in the mid-1990s, and in May 1997, unemployment fell below 5% for the first 
time since December 1973. In April 2000, unemployment dropped to 3.8%, and was 
below 4% September-December 2000. For the whole 1990–2000 period, roughly 
23,672,000 jobs were created and hourly wages had increased by a solid 10.1% since 
1996.  
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3. Early 2000s Recession 
The early 2000s recession has been determined by NBER as the period from 
March 2001 to November 2001. In 2001, the Labor Department estimated that a net 
1.735 million jobs were shed. Unemployment rose from 4.2% in February 2001 to 5.5% 
in November 2001 (Martel & Langdon, 2001).  
4. Great Recession  
The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 through June 2009, making it 
the longest of any recession since World War II, according to NBER (n.d.). During this 
period, unemployment rose from 5% in 2008 to 10% by late 2009, with the number of 
unemployed increasing from 7 million to 15 million. Housing prices also fell during this 
period by an average of 30%. 
5. 2009 to Present 
The economy has yet to fully recover from the Great Recession, but the 
unemployment rates have steadily declined since its peak in 2009. Also, housing prices 
reached a trough in 2012 similar to that of 2008, but has continued to rise since. These 
variables, along with various others, indicate that the economy is in an upward turn with 
the peak currently unforeseen, according to NBER. 
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Figure 2.  U.S. Unemployment Rate since 1990  
D. JOINT ADVERTISING, MARKET RESEARCH & STUDIES NEW 
RECRUIT SURVEYS 
As stated by the Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies (JAMRS) 
program, the objective of the organization is to preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer 
Force. JAMRS independently monitors markets essential to recruiting and is responsible 
for maintaining a comprehensive prospect database and executing an integrated outreach 
campaign. 
JAMRS performs three main functions with the first being conducting research 
and analysis within the DOD that monitors the youth market and provides information 
regarding youths’ interest in joining, reasons for and against joining, barriers to joining, 
and awareness of and reactions to DOD advertising recruiting efforts. The second main 
function is that of maintaining a comprehensive prospect database that represents one of 
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main function is reaching out to influencers, such as parents, grandparents, educators, and 
coaches – another integral aid to recruiting. Through these functions, the efforts of 
JAMRS aid in providing key insight into the effect the economy has had on the military 
in general, along with the Navy specifically. 
1. General Military Propensity versus U.S. Economy 
The propensity to enlist is a factor used to determine potential recruiting success 
as the propensity to join the military is a representation of one’s behavioral intentions 
regarding enlistment. According to the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975), behavioral intentions are strong predictors of actual behavior. The higher 
propensity rates are at a given time inherently results in a less difficult time recruiting. 
The chart in Figure 3 displays historical general military propensity by gender over the 
last 30 years. When analyzing the chart, as would be expected, the propensity to enlist 
appears to be strongly correlated with the economy. The major peaks and troughs occur 
mainly around the times of significant change in the economy.  
The first significant drop that is noted that falls into the period of this study, 
1991–2014, occurs in 1991 where the propensity to enlist dropped from 17% in 1991 to 
12% in 1992. This drop coincides with the 1990s U.S. boom, beginning in March 1991 
(NBER, n.d.). For the rest of the 1990s, small changes in the propensity rate occurred, but 
the rates remained fairly stable until 1999 where the rate dropped from 16% back to the 
rate of 12%, the lowest since 1991. The propensity rate then remained at 12% through 
August 2001. The period where this significant drop occurred took place during a time of 
historic lows in unemployment, therefore, again coming as no surprise. 
From August 2001 to November 2001, the propensity rate jumped from 12% back 
up to 16%. This spike was to be expected because of the patriotic factor in play with the 
tragic events of 9/11 taking place during this time. However, it remains to be seen how 
much the events of 9/11 factored into the propensity rates because the U.S. also suffered 
another recession from March to November 2001 (NBER, n.d.). It should be noted that 
the propensity rates dropped from 16% down to 13% from November 2001 to the 
following November 2002. 
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From November 2001 through the mid-2000s, the propensity rates fluctuated with 
a low of 13% in November 2001 and a high of 18% in November 2003. The next 
significant drop to occur took place between June 2005 and June 2007 when the 
propensity rate decreased 16% to 8%, with 8% being the lowest propensity rate recorded 
throughout the course of tracking this rate. This period includes a time in U.S. history 
where housing prices were at an all-time high, while interest rates were the lowest they 
had been in nearly 50 years (NBER, n.d.). The unemployment rates were also the lowest 
they had been in nearly 40 years with the year 2000 being the only exception during this 
time (NBER, n.d.). 
Another significant increase in the military propensity rate took place following 
this 2007 low when the rate jumped from 8% in December 2007 to 12% the following 
December 2008, with this period coinciding with the Great Recession (NBER, n.d.). 
Since this increase in military propensity, however, the rates have continued to fluctuate, 
but have remained fairly stable through present with the most recent surveys indicating a 
slight drop. During this same time period, the economy has shown recovery from the 
Great Recession, but the progress has taken place slowly (NBER, n.d.). Individuals seem 
to be waiting to see what happens next with the economy before deciding on what to 
pursue for employment. 
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Figure 3.  Historical General Military Propensity by Gender since 1984 
(after JAMRS, 2014) 
E. QUALITY HISTORY  
While meeting recruiting goals for accessions is a top priority, the goal is to 
recruit “the best and brightest young men and women” and to “to deliver the highest 
quality Sailors to the fleet,” as stated by Commander, Navy Recruiting Command on the 
CNRC website (2013). According to the March 2014 JAMRS State of the Recruiting 
Market, over the past few years, the military has experienced all-time highs in the quality 
of active-duty accessions, and these highs are attributed to the difficult employment 
environment. Coming as no surprise, when recruiting targets were missed in 1998 and 
1999, a decline in the quality of recruits from the early 1990s was noted, as well, with 
economic growth being higher and unemployment rates lower than at any time since the 
1960s (Warner, Simon, & Payne, 2010). 
In general, trends in accession quality have reflected trends in youths’ concerns 
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youth who perceive difficulty in finding a job is decreasing, and with perceptions of the 
economy improving, many Services are already reporting decreases in accession quality. 
With data from the JAMRS New Recruit study showing that youth of higher quality are 
most sensitive to economic pressures, the proportion of high-quality enlistees who 
reported that the economy made them more like to enlist has been slowly decreasing over 
the previous year as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Percentage of Active-Duty New Recruits Stating the Economy Made 
Them More Likely to Enlist, by AFQT score (from CNRC, n.d.) 
The determination of recruit quality is made based on the combination of a 
recruit’s attainment of a high school diploma and the recruit’s Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score. Recruits are then placed into categories based on this 
quality determination. Recruits scoring 93–99 on the AFQT are grouped into Category I. 
Those scoring between 65 and 92 are grouped into Category II and those scoring between 
50 and 64 are grouped into Category IIIA. Those scoring less than 50, but at least 35 are 
placed into Category IIIB, with an AFQT score of 35 being the minimum score the Navy 
accepts (CNRC).  
All of the recruits scoring 50 and above on the AFQT are then grouped by the 
Navy into various cells. These cells characterize specific trends of the recruits that fall 
into the category. Recruits who fall into Categories I, II, and IIIA, and that have attained 
their high school diploma are grouped into the A-cell, while the recruits in these 
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categories that have not attained their diploma are grouped into a B-cell. Recruits in 
Category IIIB that have attained their diploma are grouped in the Cu-cell, and those who 
have not attained a diploma are grouped in the D-cell (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Navy recruiting Quality Standards (from CNRC, n.d.) 
The traits defined in these cells are what make quality recruits so important to the 
Navy. As shown in Figure 5, A-cells are most desirable because they have the highest 
program qualification rate, lowest first term attrition, lowest training costs, fewer 
discipline problems, and have the best career performance. Individuals in the A-cell are 
the most expensive to recruit. However, once these individuals are accessed, they cost 
less in the future by way of what the aforementioned traits entail. Having the lowest 
attrition rates and training costs save the Navy money it otherwise would have had to 
spend on accessing more recruits to compensate for expected attrition and it cuts down on 
the costs associated with retraining recruits.  
Recruits falling into B-cells qualify for many of the programs A-cell recruits do in 
that they share similar AFQT scores – a precursor for many Navy ratings. B-cell recruits, 
however, have the highest first term attrition rate of all the categories the Navy accesses 
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(CNRC, 2014). An individual completing a high school diploma illustrates a 
demonstration of persistence and ability to complete a task that has been started. 
Attaining a diploma is not completely indicative of one’s ability to complete an 
enlistment since various factors lead to individuals not attaining their diplomas. However, 
B-cell recruits not finishing high school can be correlated to their being less likely to 
finishing an enlistment term as well.  
Recruits in the Cu-cell have higher attrition rates than A-cell recruits, but actually 
have lower attrition rates than B-cell recruits. This again can be attributed to the 
correlation that goes along with the persistence and the ability to complete a task begun, 
similar to that of attaining a diploma. The downside associated with accessing recruits 
from the Cu-cell is that these recruits qualify for the fewest programs; therefore, the use 
of these accessions can be extremely limited once they are accessed. While it seems to 
simply make sense to field the highest quality recruits to deliver the highest quality 
results, the Navy’s breakdown of the cells exhibit that high quality recruits, though they 
may cost more to recruit, save money by avoiding the future costs that go along with 
accessing recruits from lower cells.  
F. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING RECRUITING 
1. College Effect 
Along with the effect that the economy has on recruiting, another major challenge 
the Navy has to overcome is that of youth going to college. According to a report in the 
Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business, for Generation Z, those born after 1994, 
education is valued as a means of gaining security. It states that, “Instant access to the 
Web has bolstered respect for knowledge with 83% of 8–12 year olds saying, ‘it’s cool to 
be smart’’ (Williams & Page, 2011). With education valued so heavily at such an early 
age, being able to appeal to this aspect of today’s generation becomes more and more 
critical to recruiting success. 
Relative returns to college education rose rapidly in the 1990s, resulting in tough 
competition for recruits from the college market and subsequent skilled civilian 
employment. At a time that the military is demanding a greater fraction of high quality 
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recruits, relatively more high quality youth are attending post-secondary institutions. 
Youth interest in enlisting has dropped, while youth interest in attending college has 
grown (Asch, Kilburn, & Klerman, 1999). Also, as the economy improves, families are 
becoming more able to afford college offsets (Asch, Hosek, Arkes, Fair, Sharp, & Totten, 
2002). College costs have increased somewhat faster over the last decade than they did 
over the previous decade, College Board data shows (Leonhardt, 2013), and this fact may 
also play into recent increase in recruit quality. 
2. Patriotism Effect 
An effect whose impact on recruiting is extremely difficult to measure is that of 
patriotism. Following Operation Desert Storm which ended in 1991, recruiting was at an 
all-time high. In the months following the attacks of 9/11, the propensity to enlist saw a 
significant spike as well. An attribute both periods shared was that both periods took 
place around a recession. With a recession being in play during periods that also would 
appeal to American’s patriotism, one would imagine that patriotism played a factor. 
However, it cannot be determined whether the economy or patriotism played a larger 
role. 
G. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Previous studies researching the impact of regional conditions on recruiting 
markets include Arkes and Kilburn (2005), Murphy (1999), McNown, Udis, and Ash 
(1980), Dale and Gilroy (1983), and Brown (1985). The study by Murphy examined data 
at the county level while the other studies all examined data at the state level, with most 
using enlistments as a percent of population as the dependent variable. The study by 
Arkes and Kilburn was unique from the others in that it also examined the impact of 
policy on reserve recruiting as well.  
Arkes and Kilburn (2005) conducted a study of reserve recruiting with the goal of 
improving the Defense Department’s ability to forecast supply and foreshadow potential 
recruiting problems. As with the active forces who struggled meeting recruiting goals in 
the late 1990s, the reserve forces struggled as well during this period, facing many of the 
same challenges of active force recruiting. This study sought to specify a model that 
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identified the relationships between different variables and the effects of these variables 
on recruiting outcomes. 
Using data from 50 states and the District of Columbia for the years 1992 through 
1999, Arkes and Kilburn developed two separate models in this study—one for those 
individuals with prior military service and one for those without prior service (2005). 
Similar to this study, they examined the effects of economic, demographic, and 
“influencer” variables on reserve recruiting. They also used variables such as the 
availability of merit-based scholarships to measure the challenges colleges pose, and 
policy variables such as the availability of state educational incentive programs for 
members of the National Guard to measure the effect of policy on reserve recruiting 
(Arkes & Kilburn, 2005). 
Of the two models Arkes and Kilburn used in their study, the Non-Prior-Service 
model is most similar to this study in that as with active duty applicants, individuals 
without prior military presumably choose between entering active duty, entering the 
reserves, or not enlisting in the military. Estimating a grouped multinomial logit model, 
they used the dependent variables of the fraction of eligible high-quality young people 
who enlist in active duty, the fraction of eligible high-quality young people who enlist in 
the reserves, and the fraction of eligible high-quality young people who do not enlist in 
either active duty or the reserves (Arkes & Kilburn, 2005).  
For explanatory variables, they used annual state unemployment rates, median 
wages for men with just a high school diploma, and median wages for men with four 
years of college and no more as economic variables. They also used demographic 
variables such as race and ethnicity. For influencer variables, they used the fraction of the 
population in a state and year aged 25 to 65 who are veterans, as well as, those in the 
same age group with a college degree to account for the differences in the number of 
influencers with college experience (Arkes & Kilburn, 2005). 
With the focus of the study being on reserve recruiting, a variable indicating the 
percentage of 18 to 24-year-olds who are married was used to account responsibilities in 
households that would likely be a competing use of time to joining the reserves (Arkes & 
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Kilburn, 2005). They also included state and year dummy variables to allow the ability to 
capture state-specific effect that are not captured by the other variables in the model and 
do not vary over time.  
As with most studies, the estimates on unemployment rate were found to be 
statistically significant with a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
being estimated to increase the number of reserve recruits by almost 7 percent (Arkes & 
Kilburn, 2005). While not many of the other economic and demographic variables were 
found to have considerable effects on recruiting outcomes, states with more minorities 
were found to produce more recruits, all else held constant.  
Similar to this study, Murphy’s study examined the effect of the economy at the 
county level (1999). In this study, the author used individual applicant data for all 
individuals applying to the Armed Forces for the years 1993–1995. From this data set, the 
specific county/state for each applicant that applied for enlistment into the military was 
sorted. This data was then regressed against county-level economic variables with 
separate regression models being developed for each of the three years of data, possibly 
introducing major biases due to using cross-sectional models. Murphy then pooled the 
three years of data and discarded demographic variables that were not available for all 
three years (Murphy, 1999).  
A fixed effects model was then used to incorporate county-level dummy variables 
into the model and allowing for economic effects in a given county for that period of time 
while holding constant any unobserved effects that are constant across counties. This 
study found the coefficient estimates on unemployment to be statistically significant with 
all estimations of the fixed effects models indicating that the unemployment rate at the 
county-level impacts recruiting the same way it does at the national level (Murphy, 
1999).  
The study done by McNown, Udis, and Ash (1980) was conducted at a time in 
history when the AVF was considered a failure by high-ranking military officers, 
congressmen, and academic sociologists. During this period, recruit quality was also a 
major concern (McNown et al., 1980).   
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The study reports on unemployment and relative pay elasticities for total non-
prior service (NPS) accessions into the military calculated from semiannual, time series 
data from the first quarter of 1968 through the second quarter of 1976. With conscription 
still in effect over a large portion of their sample, total accession data was used to model 
NPS accessions by race and service (McNown et al., 1980).   
Findings of the study indicate significant pay elasticities with unemployment 
surprisingly being found to be statistically insignificant for enlistment rates or accession 
rates. Unemployment was found to be statistically insignificant even at the 35 percent 
significance level, with the estimated coefficient having the wrong estimated sign in 7 of 
20 cases, including Navy enlistment and accession rates for all males, as well as nonwhite 
males for DOD, Army, and Marine Corps enlistment and accession rates. The authors 
view these incorrect signs as further evidence of insignificance rather than as an 
indication of model misspecification (McNown et al., 1980).   
Dale and Gilroy (1983), focusing specifically on U.S. Army enlistments, sought 
to quantify the relationship between enlistments of NPS high school graduates and the 
unemployment rate. Dale and Gilroy defined the dependent variable as the total number 
of individuals that had signed contracts and had now accessed plus delayed entry 
program entrants in a given month as the numerator, unlike other studies that have used 
only accessions in the numerator. In the denominator, they used the relevant data of the 
state’s civilian population of 16 to 19-year old males. The data obtained covered the time 
period from October 1975 to March 1982 and included the number of enlistments and 
contracts of NPS high school male graduates in the military services. A linear functional 
form was developed with unemployment (lagged two and four months) being a key 
independent variable (Dale & Gilroy, 1983).  
This study found a large effect on military enlistments in pay and unemployment 
with a rise in the unemployment rate leading to a substantial increase in Army 
enlistments of male NPS high school graduates (Dale & Gilroy, 1983). They also found 
that a one-time transient shock to the system caused by a pay freeze would have a lasting 
effect on enlistment levels, causing enlistment levels to drop significantly. It was also 
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determined that non-economic factors, as well as, educational benefits played significant 
roles in individuals’ decisions to enlist (Dale & Gilroy, 1983). 
Brown (1985) measured the effects of economic factors on Army enlistments of 
NPS high school graduates using geographic variation over the period 1975–1982. Brown 
used multiple-regression and pooled cross-section/time-series models. Due to the author 
having the ability to concentrate his empirical research on the period since the inception 
of the AVF, the study, at the time, was considered an improvement on previous similar 
studies (Brown, 1985). 
 The dependent variables in this study are ratios of the number of contracts signed 
by male NPS Army enlistees to the enlistment age population (Brown, 1985). The 
recruits analyzed fell into one of four categories: total enlistees, high school graduates, 
those recruits in Categories I-IIIA of the AFQT, and Categories I-IIIA high school 
graduates. The independent variables consisted of basic military compensation, 
educational benefits, military pay relative to civilian pay, total earnings, and 
unemployment rate (Brown, 1985). 
The major findings of this study were that for high quality enlistees, a 10 percent 
increase in military pay raises the supply of enlistees by roughly 10 percent. A 10 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate increases the number of high-quality enlistees by 
about 6 percent – quite a change from previous studies where the unemployment rate was 
found to not be statistically significant or only slightly significant (Brown, 1985).   
Similar to each of these studies, this study explores the effect the economy has on 
military recruiting. With the exception of the Arkes and Kilburn and the Murphy studies, 
the authors used data from the Army for analysis while the Arkes and Kilburn and 
Murphy studies used data from all military services, with Arkes and Kilburn also using 
reserve forces data. This study will only focus on data on Navy applicants. Also, the 
Murphy study examined the economic effect on recruiting at the county level while the 
other studies examined the economic effect at the state levels. The most significant 
difference between this study and Murphy’s is that this study also seeks to determine if 
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the state or county unemployment rate provides a better predictor for Navy recruiting, as 
well as, if there is another economic variable that better predicts recruiting. 
H. SUMMARY  
This chapter has discussed the background of Navy recruiting, the U.S. economic 
conditions and the propensity to enlist in the military from 1991–2014, as well as quality 
history and other factors that also affect recruiting. It has also reviewed studies similar to 
this research that have examined the effect the economy has on military recruiting. The 
next chapter will discuss the data and methodology used in this study. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the data, variables, and methodology used to analyze the 
effects that the economy has on Navy recruiting. The data for this research were gathered 
from four different sources: the Defense Manpower Data Center, the Bureau of Labor 
statistics (BLS), Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Survey 
(IPUMS-CPS), and the Census Bureau.  
1. Defense Manpower Data Center 
For Navy recruiting data, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided 
information on all Navy recruiting applicants from the years 1990–2014. This 
information included basic demographic information on the applicants such as age, sex, 
race, as well as the recruits’ home of record state and county, AFQT scores, education 
levels, application and accession dates. This data provided a total of 2,445,994 
observations. The data were then aggregated into two separate samples—one at the 
county level and one at the state level. In these samples, the sum of the total number of 
applicants for a specific county or state was grouped into one observation per year. 
Because the latest applicant data given were for September 2014, all applicants for 2014 
were dropped. 
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The second data source used, BLS, provided the economic data for the study. 
From the BLS, state and county unemployment rates and state employment-to-population 
ratios were collected for the years 1990–2014. Each state and county was identified by a 
five-digit Federal Information Processing (FIPS) code, which uniquely identifies 
counties, county equivalents, and states in the United States. These unemployment files 
contained data on the monthly and annual unemployment rates, along with the total 
number of people employed, the total number of people unemployed, and the total 
number of people in the civilian labor force for each year. The monthly data were 
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dropped for each state and county and only the annual unemployment rates were used in 
this study. According to BLS, these unemployment estimates are derived from a variety 
of sources including Current Population Survey (CPS), Current Employment Statistics 
Surveys, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, various programs at the Census 
Bureau, and unemployment insurance claims data from the state workforce agencies.  
The BLS file containing the employment-to-population ratio contained data for 
each state, District of Columbia, Los Angeles County, and New York City. For each 
observation, it provided the civilian non-institutional population, total civilian labor force 
population, total and percentage of employed, and the total and percentage of 
unemployed. The employment-to-population ratio is the number of employed divided by 
the total civilian non-institutional population. This percentage was used for analysis. 
3. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Survey 
The third data source, IPUMS-CPS, provided county level demographic data for 
this study. This data set contained a total of 4,451,674 observations, providing county 
level data on age, race, educational attainment, and veteran status. For the variables 
obtained from this data, the interest was with the population age 25 and older to account 
for the possible effect that influencers such as parents, teachers, and coaches have on 
recruiting. Once all observations younger than the age of 25 were dropped, 2,769,844 
observations remained. 
Each observation was identified by its state and the county was identified by its 
FIPS code. While every observation provided a state, a FIPS code was not provided for 
the county of each observation. Without having any other means of determining what 
county an observation had come from, all observations that did not include a FIPS code 
were dropped before conducting the county level analysis, leaving a total of 913,736. 
Educational attainment was broken down into categories that indicated the highest 
level of education completed. For this study, the interest is in those adults who have 
obtained a bachelor’s degree or greater. A dummy variable was generated that included 
all observations that met this criterion.  
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For the veteran status variable, the responses of “yes,” “no service,” and missing 
were given, with 4,183 of the observations missing veteran status. To account for the 
observations that were missing, a dummy variable for veteran was generated that only 
included those observations whose responses were “yes.” 
All of the data obtained from IPUMS-CPS were aggregated by state and county. 
Each observation in the data is weighted with some records weighing more cases than 
others as some persons and households with some characteristics are over-represented in 
the samples, while others are underrepresented. This weight was used when aggregating 
the data to best accurately represent the data provided for each county and state. 
4. Census Bureau 
The fourth data source, Census Bureau, provided population data. This data broke 
down the population of age ranges into groups, with each group covering a span of five 
years. For this study, the ages of 15–19 were used as a proxy for the prime recruiting 
market for the military, which are ages 17–21. While the chosen age range is not the 
exact same as that of the prime recruiting age range, it represents an age range similar to 
that of the DMDC data with the prime recruiting market ages 17–21 making up nearly 
75% of the applicants received. Since this proportion is constant across all states and 
counties, the measurement error will be the same for all. 
B. DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Multiple dependent variables are used in this study to account for various ways 
the economy affects Navy recruiting. First, the application rate will be used as a means 
for examining the effect that the economy has on applicants. While the number of 
applicants would indicate the supply of applicants, the applicant rate will provide a 
measure that allows comparisons to be made across the populations of different counties 
and states. In order to determine the applicant rate, the number of applicants of a given 
county or state in a given year is divided by the population of 15–19 year olds for that 
same year.  
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A second dependent variable used is the accession rate, which is the number of 
accessions in a county or state in a given year divided by the population of 15–19 year 
olds for that same year. This accession rate allows for analysis of how accession rates 
change from year to year. 
Military recruit quality has been at an all-time high over the past few years 
(JAMRS, 2014). To examine the effect that the economy has had on high-quality recruits, 
the dependent variables high-quality applicant rate and high-quality accession rate are 
used, where the total number of high-quality applicants for a given year in a county or 
state is divided by the population of 15–19 year olds for that same year, and the total 
number of high-quality accessions for a given year in a county or state is divided by the 
population of 15–19 year olds for that same year. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables used in 
the study. The rates are all weighted to where they are equal to the averages per 1000 
individuals. The average number of Navy applicants in a state in a year is about 4.6, 
while this number is slightly higher at the county level, equaling 5 Navy applicants per 
1000 individuals. The accession rate at the state level averages about 1.8 Navy accessions 
per year, while the average at the county level is about 2.3. High-quality applicants and 
accessions at the state level are 2.5 and 1.2 per 1000, respectively, while these numbers at 
the county level are 2.7 and 1.5, respectively. 
Table 1.   State Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Applicant Rate 1173 4.595 1.838 0.777 11.490
Accession Rate 1173 1.828 0.681 0.347 4.256
High-Quality Applicant Rate 1173 2.529 1.003 0.494 7.149
High-Quality Accession Rate 1173 1.168 0.438 0.129 2.850
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Table 2.   County Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
C. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
1. Economic Variables 
The focus of this study is on the effect of the economy on Navy recruiting. In 
order to test the effect of the economy, this study uses the economic variables of 
unemployment rate and the employment to population ratio. The unemployment rate is 
defined as those individuals who are unemployed but are still actively seeking 
employment divided by the labor force. The unemployment rate is used in most studies as 
an indicator of economic health, and has often indicated that with higher unemployment 
rates, higher numbers of applicants to the military are experienced (see Arkes and 
Kilburn, 2005; Warner, Simon and Payne, 2010; Murphy, 1999; Brown, 1985). This 
variable is the primary economic variable used in this study to determine the effect of the 
economy on Navy recruiting. As with previous studies, the unemployment rate is 
expected to have an impact on recruiting as it can be expected that as the unemployment 
rate rises, the availability of jobs in the civilian sector falls, and individuals turn to the 
military for employment.  
In order to test whether there is another variable that can better predict the effect 
of the economy on recruiting, the variable employment-to-population ratio is also used. 
This variable is defined as the number of employed divided by the total civilian non-
institutional population age 16 and older. While the unemployment rate provides a 
reflection of those who are actively seeking work within the labor force, the employment 
to population ratio takes into account the population of individuals who are not subjected 
to the “discouraged workers,” who are individuals who have given up looking for work 
under the belief that there are no jobs available. This variable has the potential to affect 
the dependent variables, and it is expected that higher employment-to-population ratios 
will lead to lower applicant and accession rates. The employment to population ratio is 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Applicant Rate 50060 5.000 20.379 0.002 968.010
Accession Rate 50060 2.310 5.552 0.000 333.333
High-Quality Applicant Rate 50060 2.734 11.115 0.000 577.527
High-Quality Accession Rate 50060 1.471 3.730 0.000 333.333
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only tested at the state level in this study, as the data for this variable is not provided by 
BLS at the county level. 
2. Black, White, Asian, and Other Race Population Percentages 
Demographic factors also offer another important influence on recruiting into the 
military. The rates established in this study are as the number in each race group divided 
by the total county or state population. Blacks are generally overrepresented in the 
military, while Asians, the fastest growing race or ethnic group in the United States are 
generally underrepresented. In FY2013, 5.4 percent of the 18- to 24-year-old population 
was Asian, while non-prior service active component accessions were only 3.8 percent 
(Center for Naval Analyses, 2013). With this knowledge, it would be expected that with 
an increase in the population share for blacks, there will be higher rates of applications 
and accessions, as well as, increases in the high-quality rates. However, with an increase 
in the population share for Asians, it is expected that there will be a decrease in the rates 
of applicants, accessions, and high-quality applicant and accession rates. 
3. Bachelor’s Degree 
To account for the influence of those who serve as role models in helping shape 
an individual’s post-high school plans, a variable for college degree is used. This variable 
measures the percentage of individuals in a county or state who are 25 and older and also 
have obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher. It is expected that higher rates of adults with 
a bachelor’s degree will have a negative impact on recruiting, as one would expect the 
individuals of a region to attain similar education levels of the adults in that region. Also, 
education can be correlated to income, so even with the rise in college costs that have 
recently occurred, those with higher levels of education are likely to have children who 
also attend college, negatively affecting Navy recruiting. 
4. Veteran Population Rate 
This variable measures the percentage of veterans ages 25 and older in a county or 
state. Warner, Simon, and Payne found in their 2003 study that a declining veteran 
population was an important factor in explaining the decline in enlistments that took 
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place in the late 1990s. In this study, it is expected that the veteran population rate will 
have a positive impact on Navy recruiting, meaning that the higher the veteran population 
rate, the higher the rates of applications and accessions as well. 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 3 and 4 display the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for 
the state and county levels. The average unemployment rate at the state level over the 
years of 1991 to 2013 is 5.7 percent, while the county unemployment rates average 6.3 
percent. The employment to population ratio was only available for the state level, and 
averaged 63.2 percent for the years studied.  
The black, white, and Asian population rates are 9.7, 84.5, and 1.8 percent, 
respectively at the state level. At the county level, the numbers are similar, with the 
population rate of blacks increasing to 10.4 percent, whites decreasing slightly to 84.5 
percent, and Asians increasing to 2.6 percent.  
The population rate of having a bachelor’s degree increased from 25.7 percent at 
the state level to 28.9 percent at the county level. The population rate of veterans was 
found to average 13.9 percent at the state level and 12.8% at the county level. 
Table 3.   State Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unemployment Rate 1173 0.057 0.0193 0.023 0.138
Employment to Pop Ratio 1173 0.632 0.0452 0.487 0.733
Black Population Rate 1173 0.097 0.1071 0.000 0.667
White Population Rate 1173 0.845 0.1339 0.212 0.997
Asian Population Rate 1173 0.018 0.0509 0.000 0.537
Race Other Population Rate 1173 0.040 0.0745 0.002 0.718
Percent Bachelor Degree 1173 0.257 0.0716 0.041 0.605
Percent Vet Rate 1173 0.139 0.0285 0.055 0.224
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Table 4.   County Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
D. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A potential recruit’s decision to apply for or join the military is potentially 
affected by the current economic situation. As a means of examining the impact that the 
explanatory variables have on the applicant and accession rates, as well as on the high-
quality rates, a fixed effects model is used. The use of fixed effects models provides the 
opportunity to create dummies to capture the individual and time effects on counties and 
states over the years examined. This model allows for controlling for the unobserved 
fixed effects that take place in the state or county over the years being examined. The 
fixed effects estimation model used is: 
Yjt = Xjt β1 + γ2*(Ejt) + aj + vt + εjt 
The subscript j refers to the individual county or state. The subscript t refers to the 
time period which is year in this study. The variable Y represents one of the dependent 
variables including applicant rate, accession rate, high-quality applicant rate, and high-
quality accession rate. The X includes the control variables black population rate, white 
population rate, Asian population rate, and the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s 
degree, and the percentage of adults that have identified themselves as veterans. The Ejt 
represents the county or state economic variables used in this study of unemployment rate 
or employment-to-population ratio. Only one of the economic variables in the state 
models was used in a regression at a time to avoid issues with multicollinearity. The εjt 
represents the error term that varies with counties or states and the time period. The aj 
represents the individual county or state fixed effects, including unobserved individual 
characteristics that do not change over time, and the vt represents the year fixed effects.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unemployment Rate 50060 0.063 0.028 0.007 0.332
Black Population Rate 4510 0.104 0.130 0.000 0.885
White Population Rate 4510 0.839 0.152 0.093 1.000
Asian Population Rate 4510 0.026 0.055 0.000 0.615
Race Other Population Rate 4510 0.031 0.057 0.000 0.782
Percent Bachelor Degree 4510 0.289 0.126 0.000 1.000
Percent Vet Rate 4510 0.128 0.056 0.000 0.498
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E. DATA LIMITATIONS 
A limitation faced in this study lies in the data retrieved from DMDC. While the 
data covers the states and counties from 1990–2013, 29.2% of the observations did not 
begin to give county level data until the late 1990s. For these observations, rather than 
providing an actual FIPS code or a county name, they would provide a generic FIPS 
code. For example, a majority of the counties in Florida are simply listed as 120FL. 
While the prefix of 12 is the correct prefix for the Florida state FIPS code, the last three 
digits should also be numbers to identify which county in Florida this observation 
belongs to. Without a means of determining which counties a number of the observations 
belonged to, these observations were dropped for the county level analysis. The 
observations were still used if they provided a state and an application year. 
Another issue that came along with the DMDC data was that the state-dependent 
variable rates were nearly twice as high in the early 1990s as they were in the mid-1990s 
as shown in Figure 6. At the county level, rates were about twelve times higher in the 
early 1990s than they were in the mid-1990s as seen in Figure 7. When examining the 
data more closely, it appears that early on, DMDC only reported data from larger 
counties, and then beginning around 1997, the majority of the counties were being 
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may also take place in the states as well, with there being significant differences in the 
populations of states. 
In order to adapt to the impact that various county sizes have on the dependent 
variables, weighted and population conditioned fixed effects models were also run. In the 
population conditioned models, separate regressions are run for county populations of 15- 
to 19-year-olds greater than 1,000, greater than 2,000, greater than 5,000, greater than 
10,000, and greater than 15,000 individuals. In the weighted models, regressions using a 
weight of the square root of the population of 15- to 19-year-olds in each state and county 
were also run. 
Another limitation came with the data retrieved from CPS-IPUMS. While weights 
were attached to each observation to give the observation a more accurate representation, 
the data did not provide the demographic information for each county used in this study. 
To account for the effect of the economic variables on counties, an analysis was 
conducted on the counties that also included demographic data, and a separate analysis 
was conducted that only analyzes the effect of the economic variables on the county 
recruiting. All of the observations included a state, so the aggregated state values were 
used to conduct the analysis on individual states. 
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The objective of this research is to determine the effect that the economy has on 
Navy recruiting. By analyzing the multivariate regression results, we can determine 
whether we can better predict Navy recruiting by doing a state-level or county level 
analysis, and examine whether there is another economic variable that better predicts the 
effect of the economy on recruiting other than unemployment rates. This chapter 
discusses the state unemployment, state employment-to-population ratio, and county 
unemployment regression results.  
B. STATE-LEVEL RESULTS 
1. State Unemployment Rate 
Table 5 provides the results of the primary and weighted state fixed effects 
models that contained the economic variable state unemployment rate. All of the 
explanatory variables indicated a statistically significant effect on all of the dependent 
variables examined (application rate, accession rate, high quality applicant rate, and high 
quality accession rate). 
The state unemployment rate is associated with higher recruiting rates across all 
of the dependents variables. A one percentage point increase in the state unemployment 
rate is estimated to increase the state application rate by 0.131 applicants, the accession 
rate by 0.073 accessions, the high-quality applicant rate by 0.108 high-quality applicants, 
and the high-quality accession rate by 0.065 high-quality accessions. All of these 
increases are based on estimates per 1000 individuals and are statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  
With variation in the sizes of the state populations observed, measurement error 
occurs due to sampling error bias in the estimation of the economic variables, leading to a 
downward bias. As a means of taking into account the significant differences in state 
populations, weighted models using a weight of the square root of the population of 15- 
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to 19-year-olds in each state were also run. When applying the weights to the models, the 
only difference of note from the primary models is that the coefficient estimates on the 
unemployment rate variable are all slightly less in the non-weighted models. For instance, 
the coefficient estimate on unemployment rate in the regression for applicant rate 
decreases from 0.131 to 0.119. 
Of the race variables, the Asian population rate indicated a statistically significant 
effect on all four of the dependent variables tested. However, contrary to the hypothesis 
that the Asian population rate would negatively affect the dependent variables, it actually 
positively affected the dependent variables, all at the one percent level. The black 
population rate also is shown to increase the application rate at the five percent level, and 
when the weights are added, the coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent 
level, but it did not indicate changes in any of the other dependent variables. 
Both adults who are veterans and adults who hold a bachelor’s degree indicate a 
statistically significant effect, but in different regressions, with veterans impacting the 
applicant rates while bachelor’s degrees impacting the accession rate. An increase in the 
percentage of adults who are veterans, as expected, increases both the applicant rate and 
high-quality applicant rate at the ten percent and five percent level, respectively. An 
increase in the percentage of adults with college degrees negatively affected accession 
rates, having a statistically significant effect on both the accession rate and the high-
quality accession rate at the one percent level. When the weights are added, the 
coefficient estimates on veterans is no longer statistically significant for applicant rate 
and is now statistically significant at the ten percent level for high-quality applicant rate. 
For bachelor’s degree, the effect on the high-quality applicant rate is now statistically 
significant at the ten percent level.  
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Table 5.   State Unemployment: Results from the Primary and 
Weighted Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
2. State Employment-to-Population Ratios 
In order to test whether there was another variable that can better predict the 
effect of the economy on recruiting, a state fixed effects model was also run that 
regressed the employment-to-population ratio on the various dependent variables. Table 6 













Unemployment Rate 0.131*** 0.073*** 0.108*** 0.065***
(0.025) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007)
Black Population Rate 0.034** 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Asian Population Rate 0.042*** 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.016***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.040* 0.001 0.037** 0.002
(0.024) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree 0.007 -0.017*** 0.007 -0.010***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.879 0.841 0.862 0.831
Weighted Models
Unemployment Rate 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.099*** 0.058***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007)
Black Population Rate 0.045*** -0.005 0.014 -0.004
(0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Asian Population Rate 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.016 -0.003 0.023* -0.001
(0.023) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree 0.020 -0.011** 0.012* -0.005
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.895 0.865 0.881 0.860
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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dependent variables that the unemployment rates have, but in the reverse direction as 
expected, since these numbers account for individuals who are employed. While a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate led to an average increase of 0.131 in 
the applicant rate per 1000 individuals, the same increase in the employment-to-
population ratio led to a decrease of 0.101 in the applicant rate. The effects on the 
accession rates were the exact same, but in opposite directions. The effects on high-
quality were also similar to unemployment rates, but slightly lower with the employment-
to-population causing decreases of 0.081 and 0.056 on the high-quality and high-quality 
accession rates, respectively. When applying weights to the models, as with the state 
unemployment rate, the coefficient estimates all remain statistically significant at the one 
percent level while decreasing slightly.  
While the black population rate indicated a statistically significant effect on the 
applicant rate when tested with the unemployment rate, it no longer indicates a 
statistically significant effect when tested with the employment-to-population ratio. 
However, when applying the weights, it is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The Asian population rate indicates similar effects on the dependent variables when 
tested with the employment-to-population ratio as when tested with the unemployment 
rate and the coefficient estimates slightly decrease when the weights are applied. 
When testing veterans and adults with bachelor’s degrees with the employment-
to-population ratio, similar results are shown as when tested with the unemployment rate. 
However, the effect of veterans on the applicant rate is no longer statistically significant, 
while the effect on the high-quality applicant rate has dropped from 0.037 to 0.030. 
While the coefficient estimates on the adults with bachelor’s degrees remained quite 
similar, the change to note is that the confidence level has dropped from the 99 percent to 
95 percent for the accession rate, and from 99 percent to 90 percent for the high-quality 
accession rate. When the weights are applied, the coefficient estimates on veterans are no 
longer statistically significant, while the coefficient estimates on bachelor’s degree are 
now statistically significant for applicant rate and high-quality applicant rate, but no 
longer significant for accession rate and high-quality accession rate. 
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C. COUNTY-LEVEL RESULTS 
Table 7 contains the results from the primary and the weighted county 
unemployment fixed effects models. The coefficient estimates for unemployment rate are 
found to be statistically significant for each outcome. When weights are applied to the 













Employment-to-population ratio -0.101*** -0.073*** -0.081*** -0.056***
(0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
Black 0.023 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Asian 0.037*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.032 -0.004 0.030** -0.003
(0.024) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree 0.013 -0.012** 0.012 -0.006*
(0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.880 0.848 0.862 0.837
Weighted Models
Employment-to-population ratio -0.083*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.046***
(0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Black 0.043*** -0.007 0.012 -0.005
(0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Asian 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.012***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.009 -0.007 0.017 -0.005
(0.023) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree 0.024* -0.008 0.015** -0.003
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173
R-squared 0.895 0.869 0.879 0.862
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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level, but have decreased slightly as was the case with the coefficients in the state 
unemployment rate models. None of the demographic variables are found to be 
statistically significant in the primary models, but the coefficient estimate on the Asian 
population rate is found to be statistically significant at the five percent level in the high-
quality applicant rate regression when the weights are applied to the model. 
Table 7.   County Unemployment: Results from the Primary and 















Unemployment rate 0.166*** 0.073*** 0.130*** 0.068***
(0.063) (0.019) (0.033) (0.012)
Black -0.033 -0.007 -0.015 -0.002
(0.038) (0.011) (0.020) (0.006)
Asian 0.006 -0.002 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.030 0.007 0.016 0.005
(0.028) (0.008) (0.015) (0.005)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 4,503 4,503 4,503 4,503
R-squared 0.343 0.533 0.357 0.574
Weighted
Unemployment rate 0.097*** 0.051*** 0.097*** 0.056***
(0.029) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007)
Black -0.008 -0.000 -0.004 0.001
(0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003)
Asian 0.005 -0.001 0.005** -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.013 0.002 0.007 0.002
(0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 4,503 4,503 4,503 4,503
R-squared 0.488 0.660 0.502 0.680
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tables 8 to 11 provide the results of the primary and population conditioned fixed 
effects models containing the demographic variables for the county level effects. For the 
primary model, only the unemployment rate is shown to have a statistically significant 
effect on the dependent variables. The results indicate that for an increase of one 
percentage point in the unemployment rate, the applicant rate increases by 0.166, the 
accession rate by 0.073, the high-quality applicant rate by 0.13, and the high-quality 
accession rate by 0.068. All of these increases indicate the change in 1000 individuals 
and are statistically significant at the one percent level.  
With the significant variation in the sizes of the counties observed, measurement 
error occurs due to sampling error bias in the estimation of the unemployment rates. In 
order to account for the possibility of downward bias in the estimates due to this 
measurement error, population conditioned county fixed effects models were also run. 
These models conditioned for county populations of 15- to 19-year-olds greater than 
5,000, 10,000, and 15,000. The results for the models containing all of the demographic 
variables are also displayed in Tables 8 –11. 
Where populations are greater than 5,000, the coefficient estimates on the 
unemployment rates all drop, with the drop being nearly half of what the estimate was 
before conditioning for population. For instance, with no population control, the 
coefficient estimate on the unemployment rate was 0.166, but when conditioning for a 
population greater than 5,000, the coefficient estimate is now 0.084, indicating that the 
unemployment rate on populations greater than 5,000 has almost half the impact on the 
applicant rate than the unemployment rate when the population is not conditioned for. 
The coefficient is also nearly halved for the high-quality applicant rate at 5,000 as well. 
While there is also a decrease in the coefficients for unemployment rate for the accession 
rate and high-quality accession rate models, the decrease is not as dramatic as in the 
applicant models. This decrease comes as a surprise given that the downward bias from 
measurement error should be less, as the population size increased. Once the population 
size is increased to 10,000 and 15,000, the coefficients for unemployment continue to 
increase as expected.  
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Another change that took place when conditioning for populations in the models 
containing demographics was that the coefficient estimates on the demographic variables 
are now statistically significant in all the regressions. While none of the demographic 
variables had a statistically significant effect on the dependent variables in the models 
that did not control for population, the black and Asian population rates, and the 
percentage of adults with bachelor’s degree also show a statistically significant effect, 
beginning with when the population was greater than 5,000.  
When the sample was limited to counties with a population greater than 5,000, the 
coefficient estimates on the black population rate indicate increases in the dependent 
variables that are statistically significant at the one percent level. When greater than 
10,000, increases in the black population rate lead to increases in the applicant and high-
quality rates that are statistically significant at the one percent level, an increase in the 
accession rate statistically significant at the five percent level, and an increase in the 
high-quality accession rate statistically significant at the ten percent level. When greater 
than 15,000, the black population rate only indicates an effect on the accession rate with 
this effect statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
The coefficient estimates on the Asian population rate indicate statistically 
significant effects on the applicant and high-quality applicant rates for populations 
greater than 15,000. This effect is statistically significant at the five percent level for 
applicant rate and at the one percent level for the high-quality applicant rate.  
The only other variable indicating a statistically effect on the dependent variables 
was the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree. This variable indicates that an 
increase in the percentage of adults with bachelor’s degrees leads to a decrease in the 
applicant rate for populations greater than 10,000 and is statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  
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Table 8.   County Applicant Rate: Results from Primary and 
Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Models  
 
 
Table 9.   County Accession Rate: Results from Primary and 
Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Models 
 
  
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.166*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.069***
-0.063 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019
Black Population Rate -0.033 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.009
-0.038 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
Asian Population Rate 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.009**
-0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.03 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003
-0.028 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.005 -0.006 -0.006** -0.002
-0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
Observations 4,503 4,482 3,963 2,866
R-squared 0.343 0.691 0.69 0.843
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.073*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.040***
-0.019 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
Black Population Rate -0.007 0.006** 0.006** 0.005*
-0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Asian Population Rate -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.003
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
-0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Observations 4,503 4,482 3,963 2,866
R-squared 0.533 0.774 0.787 0.843
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10.   County High-Quality Applicant Rate: Results from Primary 
and Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Models 
 
Table 11.   County High-Quality Accession Rate: Results from 
Primary and Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Models 
 
 
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.130*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.081***
-0.033 -0.01 -0.01 -0.011
Black Population Rate -0.015 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.001
-0.02 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
Asian Population Rate 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006***
-0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.016 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002
-0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Observations 4,503 4,482 3,963 2,866
R-squared 0.357 0.702 0.711 0.825
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.068*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.049***
-0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
Black Population Rate -0.002 0.006*** 0.004* 0.002
-0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Asian Population Rate -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Percentage of adults who are veterans 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
-0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
Percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Observations 4,503 4,482 3,963 2,866
R-squared 0.574 0.753 0.771 0.82
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tables 12 to 15 display the results of the fixed effects models for counties where 
unemployment is the only explanatory variable used. One of the first changes of note is 
that the number of observations immediately drops from 50,060 for models that include 
all counties to 38,216 for models where the county population is greater than 1,000. A 
decrease in the unemployment coefficient also takes place immediately, beginning with 
populations greater than 1,000, with the decrease being most dramatic for the applicant 
rate. Oddly, the coefficient for unemployment rate increased in each model when the 
population is greater than 2,000. Not only did these coefficients increase to being larger 
than they were when the population is greater than 1,000, they also are higher than in the 
models run without the population controls. Once the population is increased to greater 
than 5,000, the coefficient on unemployment rate continues to decrease in the models for 
each dependent variable as the population is increased.  
Table 12.   County Applicant Rate: Results from Primary and 




VARIABLES Primary Pop > 1000 Pop > 2000 Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.263*** 0.187** 0.370*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.048***
-0.085 -0.083 -0.113 -0.014 -0.019 -0.014
Observations 50,060 38,216 27,272 14,263 8,264 5,611
R-squared 0.355 0.308 0.296 0.566 0.619 0.815
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13.   County Accession Rate: Results from Primary and 




Table 14.   County High-Quality Applicant Rate: Results from Primary 
and Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Model with Unemployment as 
only Explanatory Variable 
 
 
Table 15.   County High-Quality Accession Rate: Results from 
Primary and Population Conditioned Fixed Effects Model with 
Unemployment as only Explanatory Variable 
 
  
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 1000 Pop > 2000 Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.109*** 0.088*** 0.122*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.028***
-0.02 -0.022 -0.03 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
Observations 50,060 38,216 27,272 14,263 8,264 5,611
R-squared 0.339 0.309 0.306 0.696 0.755 0.822
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 1000 Pop > 2000 Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.155*** 0.132*** 0.236*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.066***
-0.044 -0.048 -0.066 -0.007 -0.01 -0.008
Observations 50,060 38,216 27,272 14,263 8,264 5,611
R-squared 0.364 0.303 0.292 0.571 0.627 0.797
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES Primary Pop > 1000 Pop > 2000 Pop > 5000 Pop > 10000 Pop > 15000
Unemployment Rate 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.037***
-0.014 -0.014 -0.02 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
Observations 50,060 38,216 27,272 14,263 8,264 5,611
R-squared 0.345 0.301 0.3 0.667 0.737 0.796
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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D. MODEL COMPARISONS 
In order to decide on which model best predicts Navy recruiting, I first compared 
the state fixed effects models for state unemployment rates and state employment-to-
population ratios to determine if one of the variables does a better job of predicting the 
outcome of interest. Because the models are non-nested, I used the R-squared values 
along with the AIC and BIC values to examine the difference between the models. With 
the R-squared, AIC, and BIC values all being extremely close, regardless of the outcome 
of interest, it appears that both the state unemployment rate and the state employment-to-
population ratios perform about the same.  
When comparing the primary county fixed effects models with the weighted and 
population conditioned county fixed effects models, the conditioned fixed effects models 
have the highest R-squared values with these values increasing as the population size 
increases, and populations greater than 15,000 having the highest R-squared value in each 
case. This indicates that the population conditioned models with the populations greater 
than 15,000 do the best job of explaining more of the variation in the dependent variables 
and the best job of predicting the outcomes of the variables of interest. 
To determine whether the demographic variables were needed or not, joint tests 
were conducted on each demographic variable included for each dependent variable, and 
the demographic variables were all found to be equal to zero in each case. Furthermore, 
with their p-values not being statistically significant, I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the demographic variables are jointly equal to zero, and therefore, they do not help 
with the predictability of the variables of interest. While the demographic variables do 
not seem to statistically effect the outcomes of the variables of interest, they do seem to 
be correlated with the unemployment rates as the coefficients on county unemployment 
rates are higher when the demographic variables are included than they are when the 
demographic variables are not included. 
To compare the state fixed effects models to the county fixed effects models, I 
compared the p-values of the coefficients in the state models to those in the county 
models. In both the state and county models, the p-values of the coefficients are 
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extremely low and are statistically significant at the one percent level. With this being the 
case, it appears that state and county level fixed effects models also perform about the 
same, with neither doing a better job of predicting recruiting. The only true change that 
took place when comparing state unemployment rate, state employment-to-population, 
and county unemployment rate models is that the coefficient on the economic variable in 
each model is different, indicating that the magnitude of change in recruiting varies 
depending on the economic variable that is used.  
E. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the unemployment rate was shown to have a major effect on the 
various dependent variables as expected on both the state and county levels. The state 
employment-to-population ratio was also shown to have a major effect on the various 
dependent variables as well, though a slightly less effect than that of the state 
unemployment rates. It appears that the state unemployment rate and the state 
employment-to-population ratio do equally well with predicting the outcomes of 
applicant rates, accession rates, high-quality applicant rates, and high-quality accession 
rates.   
When deciding between county fixed effects models that contain all counties, the 
weighted models, and the population conditioned models, the population conditioned 
models do a the best job of predicting the outcomes of the variables of interest. While the 
models perform equally well with and without the demographic variables, they do not 
seem to be needed, but do appear to be correlated with the unemployment rates. 
Of the various demographic variables tested at the state level, the Asian 
population rate variable turned out to be a surprise in that its sign was positive when it 
was expected to be negative. While none of the demographic  variables were shown to 
have an effect on recruiting success at the county levels when all counties were included, 
the models controlling for county size did show demographic factors playing a role in 
recruiting success, but these effects were minimal and only had an effect when 




Recruiting the best and brightest men and women remains essential to Navy 
mission readiness and success. While a number of factors will contribute to Navy 
recruiting success, having an understanding of the impact of these factors helps better 
prepare for the future. This study examines the impact that state and county economic 
variable rates have on Navy recruiting, while also examining whether there are economic 
variables other than the unemployment rate that can better predict recruiting. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Using state-level and county-level fixed effects models, I analyzed the effect that 
state unemployment rates, state employment-to-population ratios, and county 
unemployment rates have on Navy recruiting. 
This analysis is important because having an accurate understanding of how the 
economy will affect future recruiting allows the Navy to better identify ways of coping 
with the constant change that takes place in the economy every few years so that mission 
readiness remains at high levels. The results of this analysis indicate that the economic 
variables of state unemployment rates, state employment-to-population ratios, and county 
unemployment rates all predict Navy recruiting equally well. It also surprisingly suggests 
that the demographic variables used, for the most part, have very little to no effect on 
Navy recruiting.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While I feel that this study served its purpose of understanding the effect that 
various economic variables have on Navy recruiting, I expected the demographic 
variables to have a larger impact on recruiting than the results suggest.  
The minimal impact of the demographic variables could be linked to the fact that 
the demographic data which was retrieved from CPS-IPUMS contained so few 
observations when compared to the total number of county observations used in this 
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study. While the weights provide an increased level of accuracy, collecting more 
extensive county demographic data may show that county and state demographics do 
indeed play a larger role than the results of this study suggest.  
The minimal effect that the education variable, percentage of adults with a 
bachelor’s degree, yielded also comes as a surprising result when considering the ever 
increasing importance of education. While individuals are likely to be influenced by their 
role models to attend college, the cost of college also plays a role in college attendance. 
College costs may possibly have more of an impact on individuals with the desire to 
attend college actually being able to attend college, and therefore, a variable for college 
costs may have been better suited for determining the effect that pursuing higher 
education has on recruiting. 
Other characteristics of a county could also be taken into consideration for 
examining the effect that the economy has on recruiting. When considering the effect that 
college costs have on college attendance, an economic factor that would have an impact 
on the ability to attend college would be the average earnings of an area. Counties that 
are more financially stable will likely not be as heavily affected by the college costs, 
meaning that a better understanding of the effects of college costs on recruiting may be 
found. 
Also, variables such as housing starts and job growth could also be used in 
determining economic effects on recruiting. Along with the unemployment rates, new 
construction and job growth in areas also provide indicators of economic health. By also 
testing the effects of these variables on the dependent variables used in this study, I 
would be able to confirm that the results of the county unemployment rates are robust.  
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